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Interiority, exteriority and the realm of intentionality  
 
Abstract 
The realm of intentionality is definitive of phenomenology as a reflective 
methodology.  Yet it is precisely the focus on the intentional given that has been 
condemned recently.  Speculative realism (e.g. Meillassoux, 2008 / 2006) argues that 
phenomenology is unsatisfactory since the reduction to the intentional realm excludes 
the ‘external’, i.e. reality independent of consciousness. This criticism allows me to 
clarify the nature of intentionality. Material phenomenology finds, in contrast, that the 
intentional realm excludes the ‘inner’ (‘auto-affective life’ – Henry, 1973  / 1963). 
This criticism allows me to discuss the way in which ipseity enters as an element of 
experience. Intentionality, viewed psychologically, is rightly the distinct arena of 
phenomenological psychology. However, there is no doubting the difficulty of 
maintaining a research focus precisely on the realm of intentionality; there are aporias 
of the reduction. I discuss some of the difficulties. 
Keywords 




Phenomenology is precisely about the region of appearance, and so the question of 
externality and internality has always been an issue. In this paper I note two recent 
lines of work within ‘continental’ philosophy that attack the phenomenological 
solution to this question from different directions. Quentin Meillassoux (2008 / 2006), 
an especially clear writer within the speculative realist tendency, dismisses 
phenomenology for its inability to envisage an externality, independent of human 
consciousness. Michel Henry (1973 / 1963) in stark contrast argues that the exclusive 
focus on intentionality commits the phenomenologist to an external reference, and 
leads to an inability to envisage internality.  
These apparently contrary lines of critique of classical phenomenology arise from a 
similar frustration with what are seen to be limitations of the most definitive feature of  
the reflective methodology of phenomenology: the intentional realm. For Husserl (e.g. 
1983/1913) insisted that to scrutinize an experience purely as experience (that is, as 
intentional) an epochē is required, a setting aside of the presuppositions with which 
we approach experience. Such an epochē has the function of ‘reducing’ attention to 
what is given in intentionality. The reduction is away from experience embedded in 
day-to-day activities, for the taken-for-granteds which are entailed in daily living must 
be open to scrutiny.  
Phenomenology works within the reduction, meaning that it knows nothing other than 
that which is given in intentionality. Husserl (1983 / 1913: 44, §24) laid down as the 
‘principle of all principles’ that cognition is legitimized by acceptance of  ‘what it is 
presented as being, only within the limits of what is presented there.’ In Henry’s view 
this means that phenomenology is too late to capture pre-reflective experience, which 
is lived through rather than reflected on: the internal in its internality, so to speak. In 
the opinion of Meillassoux, the principle of all principles excludes much – most – of 
what there is, since we have no conscious access to the external in what we may 
regard as its full externality.    
To be sure, phenomena can be regarded as compounded, as it were, of an internal 
element and an external element. But such designations are far too crude. For the 
external of intentionality is never pure externality, it is noema, the experienced object 
in its appearing. The internal is never pure internality. It is noesis, the act of 
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experiencing – with the appropriate noetic mode for the specific noema; maybe 
grasping the intentional object as a perception, and perhaps at the same time as 
something remembered, and as something imaginary, and something with emotional 
force. So an object as it appears is always ‘correlated’ with the mode of consciousness 
by which it is grasped. The relationship is unbreakable; neither can exist without the 
other. I grasp an intentional object such as a past joyful moment (noema) in 
imaginative memory (noesis), and the nature of memory is affected by what the 
remembered moment is, and the remembered moment is affected by the way I deploy 
memorial consciousness. It is this inseparability of noema and noesis in the 
constitution of the intentional realm – the world as it is for a subjectivity, and the 
subject as immersed in the world – that both Meillassoux and Henry campaign 
against. ‘Campaign’ is not too strong a word.    
In what follows, I outline briefly the positions of the two authors on 
phenomenological philosophy and the specific implications of each author’s thought 
for phenomenological psychology. I counter the authors’ criticisms at least for 
phenomenological psychology, to the extent of arguing that their concerns can be set 
aside, for intentionality is indeed the realm of the science. The paper concludes with 
discussion of some difficulties for psychologists of entering into and maintaining 
attention within the reduction.  
Phenomenological psychology does not aim at discoveries of precisely the kind 
experimental psychology seeks. Experimental psychology uncovers the causal 
conditions of human behaviour, where the individual is seen as an intrinsic part of the 
objective system of mechanisms of the natural world. Phenomenological psychology, 
instead, aims to reveal the taken-for-granted meanings by which our experience is 
constituted. The intentional realm is the only appropriate venue for precisely this form 
of investigation.  
 
1. Intentionality and externality: the ‘great outdoors’ 
The recent development of speculative realism (or speculative materialism, or object-
oriented philosophy – see Bryant, Srnicek and Harman, 2011; Bryant, 2011; Dolphijn 
and Tuin, 2012) is largely motivated, as I have indicated, by frustration with 
‘correlationism’. This is the term Meillassoux uses to refer to the structure of noema 
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and noesis that constitutes intentionality. (He criticises in the same way the all 
philosophy – and he believes it is indeed all post-Kantian philosophy – which adopts 
the view – roughly – that truth is reality for a subject, whether ‘reality as 
experienced’, or ‘reality as languaged’.) For phenomenology, his aim is to escape 
from what he regards as our confinement, which correlationism imposes, within the 
‘merely phenomenal being of the transcendent’ (Husserl, 1983 / 1913: §44, 94).  
Meillasoux (2008 / 2006: 7) wishes to affirm the ‘great outdoors’ . 
The question of how to understand intentionality, and its relation to ‘external reality’, 
is a longstanding one in phenomenology, and it is as well to rehearse something of 
this history before moving to a discussion of Meillassoux’s position and its 
consequences for phenomenological psychology.  
It was, of course, Brentano for whom intentionality was the definitive feature of 
conscious life. Though he (Brentano, 1995 / 1874: 88, footnote) had firmly set aside 
the presupposition that the object of awareness had ‘a real existence outside the 
mind’, Husserl believed that intentionality as defined by Brentano could nevertheless 
be misunderstood as picturing the world as divided into internal and external realities. 
In Ideas 1, Husserl wrote: 
... [I]t should be well heeded that here we are not speaking of a relation 
between some psychological occurrence – called a mental process – and 
another real factual existence – called an object – nor of a psychological 
connection taking place in Objective actuality between one and the other. 
(Husserl, 1983 / 1913: §36, 73; his emphases.) 
Both the ‘mode of consciousness’ (noesis) and the ‘object of this consciousness’ 
(noema) are within personal experience.  In elaboration of the meaning of 
intentionality, the contributors to the book edited by Drummond and Embree (1992) 
all insist on the importance of the question of how to distinguish the ‘object as it is 
intended’ (that is the thing ‘in’ consciousness) from ‘the object that is intended’ (in 
case there might be an ‘external thing’).  Though Husserl regarded the object that is 
intended as subject to the epochē, nevertheless the relationship is a matter of debate, 
for there is a sense in which Husserl was not quite free of a kind of background 
dualism. The primary aim of Husserl was to shift the attitude of the researcher from 
such-and-such a feature of the everyday world in which that feature is a taken-for-
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granted aspect of unreflective activity, to the contemplation of that feature as it 
appears as a phenomenon of conscious awareness (i.e. to perform the epochē and 
thereby achieve the ‘reduction’). However, somehow, he makes a concession to 
objectivity simply by his emphasis on the ‘interiority’ of the phenomenon. Though the 
dualism of consciousness and the world is put out of play by the epochē, the very fact 
of wanting to put it out of play suggests there is a separately-describable objective 
world. This hint of dualism can, without care, be effectively replicated in the 
distinction between noema and noesis.  
Such a concern underlies part of the deviation from Husserl shown in the work of 
Martin Heidegger (see Ashworth, 2006). It is hard to pinpoint the nature of 
appearance in its appearing that we have in Heidegger’s corpus. We can certainly say 
that Heidegger collapses any distinction between the ‘objective’ it is and the 
‘subjective’ it seems, and this logically entails a new understanding of the reduction.  
As Hart (1992: 114) puts it: 
… it makes no sense to ask whether a true being corresponds to the noema. … 
This is not a referring to something existing independently but is the being 
itself. 
Taking this further, Heidegger considers that for one existing in the human way,  
 the Dasein’s [his term of art for self] comportments have an intentional 
character and … on the basis of this intentionality the subject already stands 
in relation to things that it itself is not. (Heidegger, 1988 / 1927: §15, 155.)  
Intentionality is not now ‘mental’. The human being as an embodied agent is in 
intentional relation with the world: Dasein’s comportments are intentional. The 
explicitness of this move from the ‘interior’ (though this is not quite what Husserl 
meant) to being-in-the-world is of great significance. Heidegger wants to say that our 
existence is built on our already being in a world: 
…[B]efore the experiencing of beings as extant, world is already understood; 
that is, we, the Dasein, in apprehending beings, are always already in a world. 
Being-in-the-world itself belongs to the determination of our own being. … 
[The world] has Dasein’s mode of being. (Heidegger, 1988 / 1927: §15, 166.)  
So the existence of Dasein is being-in-the-world. But does this mean that the world is, 
in each instance, subjective and relative to the individual, or does it mean that 
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individual existence is determined by external objectivity? This is Heidegger’s 
response: 
The world is something ‘subjective,’ presupposing that we correspondingly 
define subjectivity with regard to this phenomenon of world. To say that the 
world is subjective is to say that it belongs to Dasein so far as this being is a 
mode of being-in-the-world. The world is something which the ‘subject’ 
‘projects outward,’ as it were, from within itself. But are we permitted to 
speak here of an inner and an outer? What can this projection mean? … So far 
as the Dasein exists a world is cast-forth with Dasein’s being. … Two things 
are to be established: (1) being-in-the-world belongs to the concept of 
existence; (2) factically existent Dasein, factical being-in-the-world, is always 
already being-with intraworldly beings. (Heidegger, 1988 / 1927: §15(c), 168)  
It seems that Heidegger wants to say that to exist in the human way (Dasein) is to 
already find oneself as within the structure of meaning designated by ‘world.’ This 
means that, in apprehending something, that thing is apprehended as meaningful 
within the world. (Heidegger, 1988 / 1927, §15(c), 170.) 
It is plain that Heidegger is now committed to a phenomenological approach in which 
noema and noesis may be separable for the purposes of analysis but they are 
inextricable as bodily lived experience. Heidegger also emphasised that the meaning 
of the phenomenon is embedded in its rich context – the world. This leads to a new 
perspective on the Husserlian insistence on the immanence of the noema, and his 
setting aside in phenomenological description of the question of reality. As we have 
seen, such a description of the phenomenological approach could be regarded as 
encouraging a certain misunderstanding. In fact, as Heidegger saw – and surely 
Husserl would not disagree – there is no access to ‘reality’ that is impersonal. Indeed, 
the notion ‘objective, impersonal reality’ is a fanciful one. The world is our lifeworld. 
If in the epochē, Husserl could be understood as implicitly conceding the possibility 
of a non-existential way of getting in touch with what is, for Heideggerian 
phenomenology this is a misunderstanding and the world is the lifeworld and Dasein 
is understandable only as being-in-the-world. Any dualism of the physical world and 
the mental world is not viable. The call of phenomenology is to seize afresh the world 
as our habitation. 
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The fullest and richest development of the concept of intentionality, deriving from 
both Husserl and Heidegger, is certainly that of the Merleau-Ponty of The Visible and 
the Invisible (1968 / 1964). His earlier statements concerning intentionality, such as 
the affirmation that I am ‘a subject destined to the world’ (1962 / 1945: xi), re-affirm 
what is in effect the Heideggerian position (‘all comportment is within and towards a 
world’). Developing this, Merleau-Ponty provides an unswerving phenomenological 
account (that is, it is within the reduction) of the ‘nature’ of that world for us. He 
points out that we have a primordial ‘perceptual faith’ (1968 / 1964: 4-5) in the being 
of the world. Our embodiment entails a ‘membership’ of the world which engages us 
with it, or makes us part of it. Immensely importantly, this world in which we are 
enmeshed is a world infused with our meanings and projects: it is our lifeworld. It is 
not alien but flesh of our flesh. 
Let us take this as the general understanding of the realm of intentionality, at least in 
current existential phenomenology. The ‘correlationism’ of noema and noesis remains 
an abstraction which might suggest the pretence that the external and internal can be 
prised apart in intentionality, whereas we have seen that the distinction is dangerous, 
and may only be used analytically.  
The aspect of the ‘correlation’ which Meillassoux rails against is precisely the 
understanding that the world is nothing other than the world for consciousness, the 
lifeworld. He wishes to be able to say something about putative entities that are 
independent of, or may be discussed independently of, any mention of the human 
agent.  
Meillassoux (2008 / 2006) begins by drawing our attention to certain supposed 
entities or events which, he is sure, all informed people would agree in regarding as 
realities, but which he denies are approachable by the phenomenological method. So, 
for example, we may take the sequence of events in which the universe in a very 
dense state exploded and began its process of formation.  We take such events as true 
but they cannot be addressed as phenomena because consciousness was not there:  no 
such event could be an intentional object. Meillassoux seems to be ignoring modes of 
intentionality such as imagination and reasoning can be brought into play; and he 
apparently implies that perceptual presence is necessary. But this is only apparent. 
What he is most fundamentally criticising is this move of phenomenologists:  (a) The 
‘big bang’ really occurred as the beginning of the universe. (b) But such an event of 
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reality cannot be envisaged within a philosophy for which the realm of intentionality 
is all. (c) What can be envisaged is the ‘big bang’ for us.  This, Meillassoux rejects 
most insistently. Even though not  phenomenologically grounded, philosophy has to 
accept the legitimacy of (‘ancestral’) statements such as  
…  ‘event X occurred at such-and-such a time prior to the existence of 
thought’ and not … ‘event X occurred prior to the existence of thought for 
thought’. … [i.e.] thought can think that event X can actually have occurred 
prior to all thought, and indifferently to it. (Meillassoux, 2008 / 2006: 121-
122).   
Meillassoux wants to be able to envisage an externality that is not dependent on the 
subjective gaze. Surprisingly, however, he does not do this by dismissing 
intentionality out of hand. Rather, he argues that, if intentionality and other forms of 
correlationalism are not to devolve to absolute idealism, they must accept the 
possibility of entities and events outside the realm of human awareness. Indeed, more 
than this, Meillassoux demands that correlationalism must add a further move to those 
just listed. (d) It is absolutely true that there may be states-of-affairs such as the ‘big 
bang’ outside the correlation of thought and world, noema and noesis.   
The only way for Correlationalism to remain different from Idealism is to 
replace the absolute status of the thought-world correlate, not with finitude and 
ignorance about the otherness of the world, but with absolute knowledge that 
the world might be other than we think. (Harman, 2015: 27, 28). 
In my view, and in Meillassoux’s, this line departs from phenomenology. Speculative 
realism is not phenomenological. In fact he (2008 / 2006: 127) asserts:  
[E]very mathematical statement describes an entity which is essentially 
contingent, yet capable of existing in a world devoid of humanity – regardless 
of whether this entity is a world, a law, or an object. 
Indeed, as an instance, Meillassoux argues, harking back to ‘an incredibly obsolete 
philosophical past’ (2008 / 2006:  1), that primary and secondary qualities can be 
distinguished, in that  
all those aspects of the object that can be formulated in mathematical terms 
can be meaningfully conceived as properties of the object in itself. …  [Such 
primary qualities] can be meaningfully turned intoproperties of the thing not 
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only as it is with me, but also as it is without me. (Meillassoux,  2008 / 2006:  
3) 
Thus Meillassoux wishes to establish the right of philosophy (contra the tradition 
from Descartes and Kant) to envisage entities without paying attention to their 
relevance for, or relatedness to the human envisaging them.   
It ought to be mentioned – though the significance of this aspect of his philosophy is 
not significant for our present purposes – that Meillassoux adds to the list which I 
have been building up a most controversial final point. (e) The ‘great outside’ is not 
bound by the law of sufficient reason, by which every effect has a cause. The laws put 
forward by the sciences which lay down regularities, are not to be assumed. All is 
contingent. The uncompleted task for Meillassoux is to show how it is that there 
nevertheless are regularities. In fact he does work on the basis of the lawfulness of 
events, despite holding the view that the laws that govern the events can alter. (The 
subtitle of his most significant work, After Finitude is The necessity of contingency, 
reflecting the thought mentioned in (d) and (e) in the list above.) 
Taking the central argument of Meillassoux as I have stated it, the stance is avowedly 
anti-phenomenological in that it absolutely refuses to accept the determinative role of 
intentionality. However, to move to phenomenological psychology, I wish to make 
three points about Meillassoux’s emphasis on non-human externality: 
If accepted as a viable critique of phenomenological philosophy (about which one 
might be dubious on epistemological grounds) it nevertheless does not undermine the 
work of phenomenological psychology, which must be absolutely committed to 
intentionality. Whether philosophy should be able to speak of externality 
independently of human perception and agency or not, phenomenological psychology 
as such has nothing to say about the ‘great outdoors’ in Meillassoux’s sense, for its 
realm is specifically appearance in its appearing for a person – the intentional, with its 
lifeworld of variegated phenomena – viewed psychologically. 
Putting on one side the question of its adequacy as a  critique of phenomenological 
philosophy, Meillassoux’s thinking does helpfully highlight a distinction (which we 
make, possibly in the face of Meillassoux’s  own purposes) between 
phenomenological psychology and experimental psychology. As is well known, there 
is a strong contemporary movement seeking to draw on ‘phenomenological findings’ 
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as a resource for cognitive psychology (e.g. Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). But the 
necessity of maintaining a distinction between cognitive psychology and 
phenomenological psychology is well brought out by considering Meillassoux’s 
position. Cognitive psychology takes an external, ‘objective’ standpoint and 
approaches psychology precisely in the spirit of the mathematicised sciences of the 
‘great outdoors’. The attempt to naturalise phenomenological psychology would be to 
disconnect the phenomenological discipline from its role of describing the first-person 
lifeworld, reversing the reduction, and casting those very ‘findings’ adrift from their 
moorings in the epochē (see Moran,  2013). Phenomenological psychology and 
cognitive psychology must be preserved as separate enterprises. 
To return to Meillassoux’s argument as a challenge to phenomenological philosophy 
– if the critique were accepted, it would certainly subvert the idea that 
phenomenological psychology can be founded in Husserl’s larger project of 
developing phenomenology as ‘first philosophy’, providing the conceptual 
underpinnings of the special sciences (e.g. Husserl, 1977 / 1962). Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty already moved in a direction that denied foundationalism. Without a 
foundation in phenomenology as first philosophy, phenomenological psychology 
becomes more obviously postmodern.  We can remain agnostic on the viability of 
Meillassoux’s critique of phenomenological philosophy for it does not seem to me to 
affect the scientific discipline.  
In response to Meillassoux, then, the particular problematic of phenomenological 
psychology does not interest itself in the ‘outdoors’. But it may be  appropriate to 
distinguish more firmly between phenomenology as first philosophy and 
phenomenological psychology – accepting the possibility of phenomenological 
psychology as ‘unfounded’, and to make plain the distinction between 
phenomenological psychology and the aims of experimental psychology. 
2. Intentionality and interiority: ipseity 
If Meillassoux’s frustration with a philosophy whose area of concern is nothing other 
than the intentional realm, is due to its apparent inability to address externality – the 
great outdoors – Michel Henry in contrast expresses great dissatisfaction with what he 
takes to be phenomenology’s lack of access to the internal. By the internal, Henry 
means in particular that sense of self which is distinct from the self-as-object 
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manifested in intentionality. This non-intentional sense of self is entailed in the 
mineness of experience. It is intrinsically affective. And it does not, Henry insists, 
refer to ‘externality’. It has a mode of manifestation that is quite different from 
intentionality.  
For classical phenomenology, the self as that which has characteristics is only 
accessible as an intentional object. In contrast, Henry wishes to establish the truth of 
the self as an immediacy. Let us label this immediate self as ipseity. Take, as an 
extreme example of what Henry disavows, Sartre’s jubilant assertion that apparently 
celebrates the transcendence (externality) of the self: 
 [There] is no longer an ‘inner life’... because there is no longer anything 
which is an object and which can at the same time partake of the intimacy of 
consciousness.  Doubt, remorse, the so-called ‘mental crises of conscience’, 
etc. – in short, all the content of intimate diaries – become sheer performance. 
(Sartre, 1957 / 1937: 93-94, his italics.) 
So the key to Henry’s standpoint, the necessity of radical immanence, is the question 
of the mode by which we can be conscious (of) self. Merleau-Ponty states the 
situation of selfhood as it appears in the phenomenology of intentionality: ‘There is 
no inner man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself,’ 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962 / 1945: xi) and, ‘Where in the body are we to put the seer, since 
evidently there is in the body only “shadows stuffed with organs”, that is, more of the 
visible.’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968 / 1964: 138).   
(These externalising statements are emphatic: the self is an intentional object. 
However, we will note below that the existentialists do seem to recognise the 
minimalist presence to itself, or mineness, of consciousness .) 
Henry, wishing to establish our direct access to selfhood, ipseity, introduced a second 
mode of manifestation in addition to intentionality. A mode of manifestation other 
than intentionality is required, not just in order to provide a mode by which 
phenomenology may acknowledge ipseity, but also because intentionality as such 
lacks foundation. Phenomenology is, according to Henry, not primarily aimed at the 
production of detailed and insightful descriptions of specific phenomena such as the 
phenomenology of hope, or the phenomenology of imagination. Rather, it is most 
fundamentally concerned with the very process of manifestation – phenomenality 
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(Henry, 2008 / 1990: 2) or the question of appearance in its appearing. If so, the 
phenomenality of intentionality as such is in question, and there is an immediate 
problem. If we are to address intentionality as itself a phenomenon, it becomes the 
noema within a further intentionality, and so on – an infinite regress (see Protevi, 
2013).  
Auto-affective life provides a way of solving this problem. This is a mode of 
manifestation that has no exteriority, it is a mode of consciousness which is not 
reflective, and not representational (so there is no structure of the type noema / 
noesis); it is in fact the foundation of intentional consciousness. In putting forward 
auto-affectivity as a solution to the problem of infinite regress, it has been said that 
Henry is allied with those philosophers committed to the proposition that experience 
is necessarily owned (Alweiss, 2009), and that ‘ownership’ requires demonstration. If 
so, the claim that auto-affective life is a mode of manifestation essentially entailing 
ownership of experience is weighty. A hazard here is that one would expect that such 
a demonstration would be a manifestation to self. It would seem that we are in danger 
of another infinite regress. But in his account of self-enclosed, ‘invisible’ auto-
affective life  Henry circumvents the problem of the dative of manifestation – it is not 
a presentation to a self. Auto-affective life is selfhood in its private ipseity, and as 
such it is indubitable, ‘[Life] always means that which I may not doubt because it is 
what I am, the radical passivity of sentience itself in all its various tonalities.’ (Jarvis, 
2009: 363). I would take the view that the ipseity of experience is simply the intrinsic 
mineness  of experience. Neither the implication that there is a presentation ‘to me’ 
(this would be an intentionality), nor that the mineness brings with it personal 
characteristics (for ipseity is anonymous) are entailed. 
Henry relates auto-affectivity to Husserl’s own discussion of hylē, the unstructured, 
pre-reflective and non-intentional ‘stuff’ which will become an intentional object (e.g. 
Husserl, 1983  / 1913: §85, 246-250; see Whitehead, 2015). This impression is the 
event of a non-intentional mode of manifestation. Hylē is not constituted by an act of 
consciousness but is purely given. So the problem of the foundation of intentionality 
is solved by the prior event of non-intentional, hyletic ‘revelation’. This distinct mode 
of manifestation is purely immanent – since it is not intentional it does not ‘refer’ – 
and it provides, as it were, the matter for intentional phenomenality. Hyletic (or 
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material) phenomenology is immediate, immanent self-awareness. It is also 
essentially affective.   
Zahavi (2005: 23, 65-72; 231) emphasises the commitment of Husserl (in tension with 
the theory of intentionality) to the idea of a flow of consciousness in a mode of which 
we are not intentionally aware. Pre-reflective experience is certainly recognised by 
Husserl, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty as well as Henry. However, phenomenology is 
reflection on the pre-reflective, and it would only be in intentional experience that 
hylē, the pre-reflective, or auto-affective life could come to be thematised, subjected 
to scientific consideration, described.  
Ipseity and affectivity will be treated to detailed consideration below, but we ought to 
weigh at this stage the viability of Henry’s (and Husserl’s) account of hylē. For there 
is a significant question regarding the phenomenology of this ‘stuff’ and the claim 
that it is unstructured. Dermot Moran (2005: 114) points out that, in fact, the world is 
always a highly structured set of sensory perceivings: ‘There is a certain 
‘affectedness’ of the senses in a way that predisposes the object to appear in a certain 
way’. So the idea of hylē is problematical. Merleau-Ponty does indeed question it both 
at the beginning and at the end of Phenomenology of Perception (1962 / 1948: 3-5, 
405). 
Pure sensation will be the experience of an undifferentiated, instantaneous, 
dotlike impact. … [T]his notion corresponds to nothing in our experience…  
(p. 3) 
[E]lementary perception is therefore already charged with meaning… (p. 4) 
He goes on to argue that it is false to assume that there is an unstructured flow of 
sensation that becomes meaningful after having been somehow ‘worked on’ 
cognitively.  
The fact is that experience offers nothing like this, and we shall never, using 
the [conception of the world as meaningless] as our starting-point, understand 
what a field of vision is (p. 5). 
Work within the psychology of perception has more than substantiated Merleau-
Ponty’s criticism of the notion of hylē. In particular, James Gibson argues for the 
abandonment of the notion of sensory input. The idea of raw sensation leading to 
refined perception (and therefore the parallel view that material phenomenology 
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provides the stuff which becomes intentional phenomenology’s noematic correlate) is 
a misconception. Gibson points to such things as the complex relationship between 
voluntary movement and the world as a perceptual array. Thus, in The Senses 
Considered as Perceptual Systems: 
[T]he inputs available for perception may not be the same as the inputs 
available for sensation. There are inputs for perception, and also for the 
control of performance, that have no discoverable sensations to correspond. 
The haptic system [‘grabbing’ - the use of several sensory and motor modes to 
acquire perceptual information] … is an apparatus by which the individual 
gets information about both the environment and his body. He feels an object 
relative to the body and the body relative to an object. It is the perceptual 
system by which animals and men are literally in touch with the environment 
(1966: 97, 98, Gibson’s emphases).  
The world is not meaningless sensation; as it is dwelt in, it provides informative 
‘affordances’. The idea of unstructured hylē, then, indicative of a material 
phenomenology temporally prior to intentionality seems unsupported. This seems to 
threaten Henry’s project. But it is threatened only if one maintains a cognitivist view 
that hylē becomes noema in temporal sequence. Instead, affectivity, the mineness of 
experience (Fasching, 2009) and the other features of material phenomenology may 
be regarded as concomitants of intentionality as two parallel modes of manifestation, 
auto-affectivity silently accompanying intentionality. James G. Hart (1999: 187) has a 
view close to this.  
To take up again the notion of immanent ipseity, Henry sees his uncompromising 
rejection of the centrality of intentionality as allowing the manifestation of ipseity as 
auto-affective life.  Right at the start of The Essence of Manifestation we have this 
negative statement: 
This book was born of a refusal, the refusal of the very philosophy from which 
it had sprung. … What I want to say is that, regardless of the degree of 
adequacy in its theoretical formulation … the ecstatic becoming-present of 
Being allows its most intimate essence, i.e. that which makes it life and each 
of us living beings, to escape it.  (Henry, 1973 / 1963: ix) 
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The vehemence of Henry’s critique of classical phenomenology may be puzzling, 
because we have seen that Husserl himself also wished to emphasise the interiority of 
intentionality. The intentional object is manifested to the conscious ego; the 
connection with any world outside consciousness is subject to the epochē. Why, then, 
does Henry dissent from Husserl? Partly, of course, it is because of the existentialist 
development initiated by Heidegger. As we have seen, in Heidegger’s thinking there 
is a refusal to accept the meaningfulness of the distinction between the immanent 
object of consciousness and the transcendent object (once it is understood that the 
world is my lifeworld). For Henry, this more explicit exteriorization is an expulsion of 
‘that which makes it life and each of us living beings,’ in favour of the ‘becoming-
present of Being’ – the representation of the ‘external object’ to consciousness, and a 
correlative inaccessibility to consciousness of its own selfhood.  
Externalisation indeed, but we need care here. For ‘externalised’ selfhood is not 
regarded by existential phenomenology as lacking personal reference. Heidegger 
points out that we find our selves in the world (the world speaks of my interests and 
concerns), and it is this world to which comportment is directed. So the intentional 
object is transcendent but mine because the world is my lifeworld.  However, for 
Henry, even if my lifeworld does tell of my interests, cares, and sedimented history, 
this is not mineness in the sense of carrying the flavour, the self-awareness of 
immanent ‘life’.  
Affectivity is the essence of auto-affection … it is the manner in which the 
essence [i.e. roughly consciousness as such] receives itself, feels itself, in such 
a way that this ‘self-feeling’ as ‘self-feeling by self’, presupposed by the 
essence and constituting it, discovers itself in it, in affectivity, as an effective 
self-feeling by self, namely, as feeling. (Henry, 1973 / 1963: 462, all originally 
italicized) 
Note that Henry (1973 / 1963: 465) continues by insisting we should not expect to see 
the full gamut of emotions in auto-affectivity. (At least, in my view this is the most 
defensible reading of his view of pathos, but see his discussion of psychoanalysis, 
Henry, 1993 / 1985.) Pathos, or suffering / enjoyment, is beyond positivity or 
negativity (Henry, 2007: 255-256). It is foundational affect, is not characterizable 
more specifically. In fact, in contrast to the assumption in phenomenology generally, 
pathos is independent of the events of the lifeworld, being simply the tonus of self-
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awareness, the mineness of existence. Yet it is the ground of particular emotions and 
feelings, including the feeling tone of thought. The significance of affect for Henry’s 
project of a phenomenology of pre-reflective life, aware of itself in its mineness, is 
clear. Pathos founds the way in which experience matters to the living individual.  
Auto-affective life is immanently self-aware. But it should be recognised that the self 
of auto-affectivity is quite close to the non-thetic awareness of itself of consciousness 
acknowledged by existential phenomenology (Kelly, 2004: 266). For Sartre, 
subjectivity is precisely the pre-reflective self-awareness of not being the object of 
intentionality (see Zahavi’s, 2007, discussion), and consciousness is definitively 
present to itself.  
It is important to emphasise that auto-affective life, since it does not refer, is not 
connected to the events of the lifeworld, it cannot carry worldly meaning, it cannot 
relate to any notion of agency, and the intimate, indeed inextricably unified, elements 
of immanence do not seem to permit any form of selfhood that is personal; it is 
anonymous. The mineness of experience does not entail the characteristics  associated 
with the social or personal identity of the experiencer. The distinction between auto-
affective mineness and the personal selfhood which may be an intentional object is 
central. 
Finally, even though we are it as consciousnesses, auto-affective life can only reach 
reflection and lifeworldly meaning when it enters the intentional realm. If ipseity and  
pathos are defensible as definitive of what we most intimately are as existing, 
nevertheless, Henry’s sometimes emphatic downplaying of intentionality is, in my 
view, unsupportable. The lifeworld is our habitation, and is where our anonymous 
ipseity reaches description as selfhood and our pathos may motivate agency.  
What, then, are the implications for phenomenological psychology of Henry’s radical 
interiority?  
As psychologists, we may note the critique of intentionality in which Henry argues 
that this mode of manifestation is lacking philosophical foundation. If intentionality is 
the sole mode of manifestation for phenomenology, it must be founded through 
becoming the intentional object of a further intentionality. This would mean entering 
an infinite regress. Auto-affectivity as a non-intentional mode of manifestation may 
be postulated as foundational of intentionality. However, in my opinion, 
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phenomenological psychology does not need, for its own scientific purposes, any 
guarantee of a foundational sort. As we saw with Meillassoux, phenomenological 
psychology may be pursued without philosophical security. 
Much more interesting is Henry’s demand that we pay attention to the ipseity and 
pathos that constitute auto-affective life. His understanding of interiority points to 
immediate, non-intentional selfhood and emotional tonus, and this can be 
acknowledged as basic to subjectivity. Ipseity is about our subjectivity as such, and is 
anonymous. Similarly pathos does not specify some specific emotion or set of 
emotions. Pathos is about the emotional fact that experience ‘matters’.  
The non-intentional nature of auto-affective life means that the way in which this ‘I’ 
relates to the lifeworld can only be through the manifestation of intentionality. The 
identification Henry forges between auto-affective life and a non-worldly hyle is 
problematical. Auto-affective life can only register as psychologically meaningful (a) 
insofar as it shown phenomenologically to be the necessary condition of that which is 
unfolded in intentionality and (b) when in reflection it becomes itself the stuff of 
intentionality. 
To be more specific, in phenomenological psychology, auto-affective life has an 
equivalent status to ‘the great outdoors’. It is a kind of ‘objective’ selfhood. But 
ipseity and pathos must become ‘what I seem to be’ in intentional manifestation for it 
to enter imagination, perception, reflection, etc. It is this ‘what I seem to be’ that has 
phenomenal being. Phenomenological psychology will describe identity, the person’s 
sense of agency, their feeling of their own presence and voice in the situation, etc. as 
these appear.  
However, very importantly, if ipseity and pathos are shown to be necessary conditions 
for a meaningful human lifeworld, this constitutes an obstacle to the naturalisation of 
phenomenology.  If the description of a phenomenon has as a central feature, a 
paramount essence, the engagement of my affective-selfhood in any lifeworldly event 
at all, this cannot be naturalised.  
In summary of this situation, Henry can be accorded significant praise for drawing 
attention to the ipseity and pathos of immediate self-awareness.  However, this is of 
significance for phenomenological psychology in the context of a re-emphasis on the 
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centrality of intentionality.  Intentionality must be given its due in Henry’s 
phenomenology. 
3. Phenomenological psychology 
Let us summarise, and consider the lessons which study of Meillassoux and Henry 
have taught.  Recall: 
Phenomenological psychology does not aim at discoveries of precisely the 
kind experimental psychology seeks. Experimental psychology uncovers the 
causal conditions of human behaviour, where the individual is seen as an 
intrinsic part of the objective system of mechanisms of the natural world. 
Phenomenological psychology, instead, aims to reveal the taken-for-granted 
meanings by which our experience is constituted.  
Within this definition of phenomenological psychology, aided by the discussion of the 
two recent thinkers we must clarify intentionality as the realm of investigation of the 
science, and clarify the reduction to the realm of intentionality which is the principle 
methodological move of phenomenological psychology. 
Study of the criticisms of phenomenology by Henry and Meillassoux reinforce the 
following three observations. Firstly, the ‘great outdoors’ detached from any 
consciousness is not of concern to phenomenological psychology. The idea of a 
reality distinct from experience does not play a part in the realm of intentionality, 
which is the area of investigation of phenomenological psychology. The world is my 
lifeworld. It is and it seems are not distinguishable. Secondly, ipseity and pathos are 
similarly of concern to phenomenological psychology only insofar as they are 
implicated in the phenomena manifested by intentionality (specifically, in the 
mineness and the emotional tonus of the lifeworld). The world is precisely my 
lifeworld. Thirdly, phenomenological psychology presupposes neither that the 
intentional world is part of the natural world, nor that the intentional world is 
pervaded by ipseity and pathos. If these come to light, they do so as part of the 
meaning of what is apparent in its appearing in the intentional realm. This statement 
should not be seen as in any way downplaying the meaning from the viewpoint of 
consciousness of the world. As was said repeatedly by Merleau-Ponty (e.g.  1962/ 
1945: vii), from the start the world exists and has meaning for me. Nor should it be 
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seen as downplaying the fact that the lifeworld has significance as mine – again, from 
the viewpoint of consciousness.  
We may also note that there is no need to seek a philosophical foundation for 
phenomenological psychology. It is sufficiently specified by the reduction to the 
lifeworld. If  this foundationlessness draws phenomenological psychology away from 
Husserl’s project, this does not affect the focus or weight of the discipline.  
So let us consider the reduction, intentionality, and its phenomena. 
The reduction, and the epochē by which it is attained, are badly specified if they are 
simply seen as a set of self-denials whereby the researcher sets aside certain possible 
assumptions. This bracketing is involved, but it is motivated by the aim of attaining 
access to the lifeworld.  Perhaps ‘bridling’ (Dahlberg, Dahlberg and Nyström, 2001: 
121) is a better metaphor because the direction of the ‘horse’ is toward the lifeworld.  
By actioning the epochē, the investigator turns from the natural attitude, in which our 
awareness of things is not attended to, but is built into our ordinary activities with the 
implicit function of realising our day-to-day projects , to a focal interest on the 
awareness of phenomena as given in consciousness.  To define epochē as bracketing 
reality or suspending the question of the reality of the object is correct but misleading 
because it neglects the positive function of the move. Though Zahavi (2007: 30) 
elides ‘reality’ and noema in the following, if we understand ‘reality ‘within the 
reduction he makes an important point about the meaning of the methodological move 
entailed in the epochē. 
The purpose of the epochē and reduction is not to doubt, neglect, abandon, or 
exclude reality from consideration ... [but] to suspend a certain dogmatic attitude 
towards reality, thereby allowing us to focus more narrowly and directly on reality 
just as it is given. 
The reduction brings afresh the lifeworld and its phenomena to awareness. It is as if 
there were a ‘real world’ which required a re-orientation of attention: what is done in 
the reduction is a seizing again of the world as our habitation: flesh of our flesh. 
An individual’s experience of a phenomenon is not free-floating or abstract, but is set 
in that person’s specific lifeworld.  Research will seek the essential ‘conditions of 
possibility’ of such-and-such an experience – the features without which the 
experience would not be one of this kind. But in any particular personal instance, the 
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experience will be thoroughly linked with other aspects of the individual’s lifeworld. 
Research therefore alternates between the idiographic understanding of an 
individual’s experience within the lifeworld, and the description of the essential 
features of a specific experience.  
It can be argued that there is an extra problem in approaching the lifeworld of another 
in phenomenological psychology. To turn attention to phenomena in their appearing 
in one’s own experience is one thing. To attempt to describe someone else’s 
experience under the reduction is said to be more problematical (Smith, Flowers and 
Larkin, 2009; Langdridge, 2007: 107). I would dispute this. The mistake is to think 
that access to one’s own experience as a matter of contemplative description is 
straightforward. In fact detachment from the natural attitude, in which experience is 
bound up with one’s own concerns such that phenomena as such are submerged 
within projects of daily life, is a difficult process. The assistance of an interlocutor, 
who has a different lifeworld, in a research process in which one’s taken-for-granted 
perceptions, imaginings and emotions can be held up to the light and subjected to 
more intense imaginative variation, may lead to a more rigorous and profound 
description. 
The task of developing a description within the realm of intentionality is not 
straightforward, then. Firstly, there are aporias – points of puzzlement – of  the 
reduction and of the epochē. Take as examples the following: (a) a researcher 
(whether describing their own experience or that of another) has of course to begin, at 
least, with habitual categories normally embedded in the language, and (b) the change 
in one’s attitude from immersion in a personal project to the phenomenological 
attitude can hardly be a pure switch: one remains the same person, and  ‘to do 
phenomenology’ is a project. Such aporias are not, however, viscious. Descriptions of 
a lifeworld and its phenomena require self-critical scrutiny. Does our language 
describe what it is like? Attempts to perform the epochē are continually in danger 
sliding away from a commitment to the reduction.     
Too concerned with such aporias and insufficiently aware that the reduction, the 
sphere of intentionality, is the definitive arena of phenomenology, some researchers 
(e.g. Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009) argue that, if the epochē cannot be consistently 
achieved, an interpretative moment is inevitable. However, there is a need, not always 
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noted, to control interpretation so as to elucidate, rather than direct the interrogation, 
of intentionality. 
A candid methodological account by Heidegger of his approach to interpretation may 
be seen as a warning by phenomenological psychologists: 
Every exposition must of course not only draw upon the substance of the text; 
it must also … imperceptibly give to the text something out of its own 
substance. This part that is added is what the layman, judging on the basis of 
what he holds to be the content of the text, constantly perceives as a meaning 
read in, and with the right that he claims for himself criticises as an arbitrary 
imposition. Still, while a right elucidation never understands the text better 
than the author understood it, it does surely understand it differently. Yet this 
difference must be of such a kind as to touch upon the Same toward which the 
elucidated text is thinking. (Heidegger, 1977 / 1952: 58) 
Philipse (1998: 49) points out that Heidegger’s openness about ‘adding extra’ is 
astonishing in that he recommends that the interpretative surplus is introduced without 
differentiating it: it is to be introduced covertly. Moreover, surplus meaning derives 
from the interests of the interpreter. Philipse (1998: 49) argues that an interpreter who 
is properly conscientious should make plain the difference between any interpretative 
hypothesis and the text under consideration. Maybe Heidegger’s viewpoint on 
interpretation could be defended in terms of the hermeneutic circle (Heidegger, 1972 / 
1927: 188) or by Gadamer’s (1989 / 1960: 277) discussion of the role of prejudice. 
But Philipse’s alarm means that we cannot take interpretation lightly. Nor can we 
simply say that our phenomenology is interpretative without ensuring that it remains 
within the reduction. (Heidegger’s reference to ‘the Same’ cannot be taken as 
conceding this necessity – it refers to his view that interpretation brings to light 
concealed thought relating to the philosophy of Being. 
We may assume that interpretation in the sense used by Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 
2009 in their ‘interpretive phenomenological analysis’, remains within the realm of 
intentionality and is not directed by other concerns (as Heidegger seems to be 
proposing). The test is  this: Whose world is being portrayed by the research? To 
remain within the realm of intentionality is the ongoing methodological challenge of 
phenomenological psychology.   
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The question of remaining within the reduction in phenomenological-psychological 
research is brought to the fore in William James’ detailed development of the idea that 
researchers have a tendency to project their scientific or personal view onto the 
conscious experience of the research participant, rather than paying attention to the 
experience itself, in its own terms, as experienced. He called this error the 
‘psychologist’s fallacy’ (Ashworth,  2009;  Giorgi, 1981; Bird, 1986; Reed, 1996, and 
Wilshire, 1968).  
James’s account of the fallacy in The Principles of Psychology begins like this:  
The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his own standpoint with that of 
the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall hereafter call this the 
‘psychologist’s fallacy’ par excellence. … The psychologist … stands outside of the 
mental state he speaks of. Both itself and its object are objects for him. Now when it is 
a cognitive state (percept, thought, concept, etc.), he ordinarily has no other way of 
naming it than as the thought, percept, etc., of that object. He himself meanwhile, 
knowing the self-same object in his way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought 
which is of it, knows it in the same way in which he knows it, although this is often 
very far from being the case. (James, 1950/1890, vol 1: 196. James’s emphases.) 
So the researcher, without reflection, can assume that the research participant is 
experiencing as they would from the research perspective. James is warning that this 
sharing of standpoint is a false presupposition. Effectively it is a loss of footing in the 
epochē. A number of forms of the psychologist’s fallacy can be listed (Ashworth, 
2009). They are all ways in which the researcher can inadvertently move from a focus 
on the intentional realm, the lived experience of the research participant. 
Conclusion 
I have outlined the thought of two ‘continental’ philosophers who share a profound 
resistance to the definitive characteristic of phenomenology, its focus on intentionality 
as its realm. Phenomenology knows nothing outside the reduction to appearance in or 
for consciousness.  
Meillassoux points to features of the world which he would regard as independent of 
any conscious knowing – the ‘great outdoors’ – and demands that philosophy be 
permitted to address these (contingent) entities. Henry argues that the intentional 
realm requires as foundation a distinct mode of manifestation, auto-affective life, out 
of which come both ipseity as the mineness of experience, and the affective weight of 
such selfhood (pathos).  Whatever the validity of these lines of criticism for 
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phenomenological philosophy, I have argued that they do not undermine the 
phenomenological psychological endeavour. The ‘great outdoors’ is not of concern to 
our science insofar as is and seem are the same in description of lifeworlds and of 
phenomena under the reduction. Ipseity and pathos matter to phenomenological 
psychology insofar as that the mineness of experience and its affective weight appear, 
presented within the structure of intentionality.  
These arguments add moment to the claim that phenomenological psychology and 
experimental psychology must be regarded as separate enterprises, for ipseity as a 
feature of the lifeworld is certainly not implicated in the ‘great outdoors’, whereas 
experimental psychology is precisely the venture aimed at showing that human 
behaviour and experience is part and parcel of the impersonal causal system of the 
‘objective world’, ideally mathematicisable.  
Having established again in the face of the attacks of Meillasseux and Henry that, at 
least for phenomenological psychology, the realm of intentionality is exactly the arena 
of research and that clarification of experience under the reduction is the aim of the 
discipline, it is plain that this faces important challenges. I insist that the 
methodological move that takes the researcher into the reduction, the epochē, is 
essential. The reduction is where the lifeworld and its phenomena are found. 
However, the epochē is not straightforward.  
Recent psychological approaches (such as those of Smith, Flowers and Larkin, 2009) 
have noted certain aporias of the reduction, but have not apparently seen that great 
caution needs to be observed when trying to develop psychological findings by 
moving to an interpretative mode. Heidegger (1977 / 1952) appeared happy to apply 
interpretation to texts because it enabled him to ‘show’ that they had certain 
characteristics of interest to the philosophy of Being. In phenomenological 
psychology, since – as we have seen – everything depends on remaining within the 
reduction, interpretative work is justified just so far as it can be seen to stay with and 
illuminate lived experience. It then escapes the psychologist’s fallacy of William 
James, where the intentional realm is missed or subverted by inadequacy in continual 
attention to the epochē.  Research within the reduction is definitive of 
phenomenological psychology. This is true whether the research participant is the 
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